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We accomplish studies of properly quantifying eavesdropper’s information gain in individual at-
tacks on the BB84 system of quantum key distribution. A noticeable sensitivity of conclusions to
the choice of information measures is brightly revealed, when generalized state discrimination is
used at the last stage. To realize her aims, Eve intrudes into the communication channel with some
entangling probe. The Fuchs–Peres–Brandt (FPB) probe is known as a powerful individual attack
on the BB84 protocol. In the simplest formulation, Eve uses the Helstrom scheme to distinguish
output probe states. In conclusive eavesdropping, the unambiguous discrimination is utilized. In the
intermediate scenario, she can apply a generalized discrimination scheme that interpolates between
the Helstrom and unambiguous discrimination schemes. We analyze Eve’s probe performance from
the viewpoint of various measures for quantifying mutual information.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ta, 03.67.Hk
Keywords: BB84 protocol, Helstrom scheme, unambiguous discrimination, Re´nyi entropy, mutual informa-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, quantum cryptography is considered to be a long-term solution to the problem of communication security
[1–4]. It is one of emerging technologies based on new application of quantum phenomena [5–7]. Due to famous
Shor’s results [8], we have obtained a lot of quantum algorithms for algebraic problems [9] including those with an
impact on classical cryptology [10]. The BB84 protocol [11] is both the first and most known scheme for quantum
key distribution. Another scheme of rather methodological interest is based on two non-orthogonal states [12]. One
of basic problems in this field of investigations is to analyze vulnerabilities of quantum cryptography protocols. In
principle, there are numerous scenarios of eavesdropper’s activity. Individual attacks form the simplest and intuitively
reasoned way to break a bit sequence shared due to quantum key distribution. Here, Eve intrudes into the channel
and entangles each information carrier with her probe. After manipulations, altered carriers come to the receiver,
whereas entangling probes are measured by Eve to recognize the original state of each carrier. The main question
of information-theoretic origin is how to characterize quantitatively a performance of quantum cryptographic probes.
Studies of individual attacks on systems of quantum cryptography were initiated in [13].
During quantum key distribution with eavesdropping, each of the three parties will obtain some string of bits.
Treating such strings as random variables, a degree of dependence between two of them is usually measured by the
mutual information. This approach used in [13] was motivated due to some results of the paper [14]. The authors of
[15] have accomplished a detailed analysis of individual attacks. Together with the standard mutual information, the
so-called Re´nyi mutual information was utilized in [15]. However, the treatment of mutual information quantifiers
essentially depends on their properties. Such properties are closely related to the used definition of conditional
entropies. There is no generally accepted definition of conditional entropy of the Re´nyi type [16, 17]. Existing
approaches to this notion do not allow us to protect all the properties of the standard information functions. As is
already mentioned in [18], some measures to quantify mutual information are inadequate in the context of quantum
cryptography. This fact has been shown by comparing the two cases of state discrimination possible after the action
of Eve’s entangling probes. If Eve uses conclusive eavesdropping, then measures of mutual information of the Re´nyi
type lead to wrong conclusions about a probe performance.
Conclusive eavesdropping is one of possible ways, in which Eve may discriminate states of her target qubit. There
are intermediate discrimination schemes that interpolates between the Helstrom scheme and the unambiguous one.
Such an analysis does not seem to have been previously recognized in the literature, but arises naturally in the problem
of probe performance estimation. The aim of the present work is to study measures of mutual information from the
viewpoint of such scenarios of eavesdropping. The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II, we briefly describe
details of the Fuchs–Peres–Brandt probe for an individual attack on the BB84 protocol. Schemes of discrimination
between two pure states are recalled as well. Section III is devoted to required information-theoretic notions with a
short sketch of basic properties of the Re´nyi entropic functions. In Sect. IV, we apply both the Maassen–Uffink and
majorization uncertainty relations to measurements of the considered form. Main findings are considered in Sect. V.
In effect, one demonstrates a certain inadequacy of several α-measures of information of the Re´nyi type to quantify
Eve’s probe performance. This feature is brightly revealed by consideration of the scenario with generalized state
2discrimination. This conclusion holds for the popular choice α = 2 as well as for larger orders that may be used in
information functions. In Sect. VI, we conclude the paper.
II. DETAILS OF THE FPB PROBE
In this section, we first recall the Fuchs–Peres–Brandt probe for an individual attack on the BB84 protocol. The
second part of this section briefly describes existing schemes of discrimination between two pure states of a qubit.
The problem of optimization of probe characteristics was originally examined by Fuchs and Peres [19]. They showed
numerically that the optimal detection method for a two-level system can be obtained with a two-dimensional probe.
Brandt [20, 21] later noted that the obtained probe for attacking the BB84 scheme can be realized with a single
CNOT gate. Following [22, 23], this probe will be referred to as the Fuchs–Peres–Brandt (FPB) probe. The well-
known analysis of [15] is related to the case, in which the error-discard method is used as a reconciliation procedure.
When Alice and Bob use other reconciliation methods, the FPB probe is generally not optimal [24]. We will assume
that Bob’s detectors and Eve’s detectors have not failed at all. In this sense, a discussed situation is idealized. It is
natural that security analysis depends on the assumptions used to schematize a practical setup. Concerning the BB84
protocol, important steps in security proofs were accomplished in the papers [25–27]. Individual attacks have been
analyzed in various respects [28–30]. Security of quantum key distribution against collective attacks was examined in
[31].
In the BB84 scheme, Alice and Bob use the two polarization bases,
{|h〉, |v〉} and {|r〉, |ℓ〉}. With respect to the
horizontal polarization, the kets |r〉 and |ℓ〉 of the diagonal basis relate to the angles π/4 and 3π/4, respectively. In
each bit interval Alice sends a single photon prepared accordingly. Intercepting this photon, Eve inputs it as the
control qubit into her CNOT gate acting in the basis of kets
|0〉 = cos(π/8)|h〉+ sin(π/8)|v〉 , (1)
|1〉 = − sin(π/8)|h〉+ cos(π/8)|v〉 . (2)
Eve prepares her own probe photon in the initial state
|tin〉 = c |+〉+ s |−〉 , (3)
where c =
√
1− 2PE , s =
√
2PE , and
|±〉 = |0〉 ± |1〉√
2
. (4)
The sense of the parameter PE ∈ [0; 0.5] is clarified as follows. Once Alice and Bob have produced some string, they
select a sample of sufficient size and publicly announce the values of those bits. To detect Eve’s activity, Alice and
Bob calculate the fraction of bits which disagree. This fundamental parameter is called the bit error rate.
The state (3) is used as the target qubit of Eve’s CNOT gate controlled by sent Alice’s qubit. Here, we will express
the gate output in the form, in which the first qubit is represented in a proper basis. Let us introduce subnormalized
vectors
|t±〉 = c |+〉 ± s√
2
|−〉 , (5)
|tE〉 = s√
2
|−〉 . (6)
When Alice uses the basis
{|h〉, |v〉}, Eve’s CNOT gate acts as
|h〉 ⊗ |tin〉 7−→ |h〉 ⊗ |t+〉+ |v〉 ⊗ |tE〉 , (7)
|v〉 ⊗ |tin〉 7−→ |v〉 ⊗ |t−〉+ |h〉 ⊗ |tE〉 . (8)
For states of the basis
{|r〉, |ℓ〉}, we similarly get
|r〉 ⊗ |tin〉 7−→ |r〉 ⊗ |t+〉 − |ℓ〉 ⊗ |tE〉 , (9)
|ℓ〉 ⊗ |tin〉 7−→ |ℓ〉 ⊗ |t−〉 − |r〉 ⊗ |tE〉 . (10)
The vectors |t±〉 and |tE〉 in the above formulas are subnormalized. So, their squared norms are related to the
corresponding probabilities. Calculating the inner product 〈t+|t−〉 = 1 − 3PE , we further restrict a consideration to
the range PE ∈ [0; 1/3].
3Suppose that Bob measures the received photon just in the basis that Alice has employed. With no eavesdropping,
his outcomes will match what Alice sent. After a sufficiently long session of sending photons, Bob has chosen the right
basis in a half of cases. Alice and Bob then discard all cases, in which Bob has taken the wrong basis. Hence, they
share the sifted bits that should be error-free without eavesdropping. It is seen from the formulas (7)–(10) that Bob’s
outcome will sometimes be opposite to what Alice has sent. Such cases are described by the terms which involve the
subnormalized vector |tE〉. As its squared norm is equal to PE , the latter term gives a fraction of mismatches in those
bits that have been used to test eavesdropping. To learn shared bit values of Alice and Bob, Eve should distinguish
between the subnormalized outputs |t+〉 and |t−〉 of the target qubit. At this stage, she could apply suitable schemes
of quantum states discrimination.
In general, different quantum states cannot be perfectly discriminated. In the approach developed by Helstrom
[32, 33], the optimal measurement is built to minimize the average probability of erroneous answer. Another method
is known as unambiguous state discrimination as well as the IDP scheme due to Ivanovich [34], Dieks [35], and Peres
[36]. From a general perspective, unambiguous discrimination was discussed in [37]. Its principal point is possibility
of inconclusive answer, which allows us to avoid the error of misidentification. The version of the B92 scheme with
unambiguous discrimination on Bob’s side was examined in [13]. Of course, more general strategies of discrimination
could be assumed. Concerning the case of linearly independent pure states, such strategies were addressed in [38, 39].
The authors of [40] extended this approach to mixed quantum states. In the following, we briefly recall the generalized
scheme of discrimination of two non-orthogonal pure states.
Concerning the BB84 protocol, the following fact should be mentioned. There exist a version of the protocol, in
which Alice and Bob extract a secret key from mismatched measurements [41]. In these cases, Alice’s and Bob’s
actual bases do not coincide. In the standard version, results of such measurements are completely discarded. As
is shown in [41], the legitimate users of the channel can process results of mismatched measurements to share secret
key. The procedures of information reconciliation and privacy amplification are realized similarly to Shor and Preskill
[25]. The authors of [41] showed that the key rates available from matched and mismatched measurements cannot be
simultaneously positive. An essential ingredient of this proof is based on the Maassen–Uffink uncertainty relation [42].
Another important observation is that the participants cannot extract a secret key, when outcomes of mismatched
measurements have equal probabilities. The FPB probe is such that generated error probabilities are the same with
respect to the two bases. For this reason, we further focus on the standard treatment of the BB84 protocol.
The most direct way to discriminate pure states uses two projectors being a particular case of the Helstrom scheme.
More sophisticated approach is known as unambiguous state discrimination. In the context of individual attacks,
this approach was examined in [43]. As is pointed out in [22], the existence of inconclusive answer leads to more
complicated character of performance of the FPB probe. Unambiguous state discrimination plays an important role
in source-side attacks on decoy-state quantum key distribution with the source realized through a weak coherent
state [44]. It is also possible to use a generalized discrimination scheme that interpolates between the Helstrom and
unambiguous discrimination schemes [38–40].
To learn an Alice’s qubit, Eve should distinguish between |t+〉 and |t−〉. Recall that these states are symmetric
with respect the basis
{|+〉, |−〉}. Further, we will refer just to this basis. Using the parameter θ, we consider the
states |θ+〉 and |θ−〉 expressed as
|θ+〉 =
(
cos θ
sin θ
)
, |θ−〉 =
(
cos θ
− sin θ
)
. (11)
Their inner product is equal to 〈θ+|θ−〉 = cos 2θ. Assuming θ ∈ (0;π/4), we focus on non-identical and non-orthogonal
states. Due to the results of Davies [45], one can restrict a consideration to rank-one measurement operators. We will
express them in terms of three unit kets, namely
|γ+〉 =
(
sin γ
cos γ
)
, |γ−〉 =
(
sin γ
− cosγ
)
, |γ?〉 = |+〉 =
(
1
0
)
, (12)
where γ is some angle. The latter is chosen so that |γ+〉 is closer to |θ+〉 and |γ−〉 is closer to |θ−〉. The measurements
operators are proportional to the operators |γ±〉〈γ±| and |γ?〉〈γ?|. To provide the completeness relation,
M+ +M− +M? = 1 , (13)
coefficients should obey certain conditions. Here, we present only the final expressions,
M± =
1
1 + cos 2γ
|γ±〉〈γ±| , M? = 2 cos 2γ
1 + cos 2γ
|γ?〉〈γ?| . (14)
4For each of the two inputs |θ+〉 and |θ−〉, one may give three outcomes, namely the success answer, the erroneous one
and the inconclusive one. If the inputs have equal prior probabilities, then the average probabilities are written as
QS =
sin2(2θ + φ)
1 + cos 2γ
, QE =
sin2 φ
1 + cos 2γ
, Q? =
2 cos 2γ cos2 θ
1 + cos 2γ
. (15)
Here, we introduce auxiliary angle φ such that 0 ≤ φ ≤ π/4 − θ and γ = θ + φ. It should be pointed out that the
above expressions saturate the lower bound [38]
QE ≥ 1
2
(
1−Q? − sin 2θ
√
1− Q?
cos2 θ
)
. (16)
The measurement operators (14) are optimal with respect to the symmetric case of equiprobable inputs. For more
general cases, see the papers [38–40]. We ask for a performance of the FPB probe, when Eve uses the described
intermediate scheme of state discrimination.
In the following, we will refer to the particular cases of the above formulas. In the Helstrom scheme, we take
φ = π/4− θ, whence Q? = 0 and
QS =
1 + sin 2θ
2
=
1 +
√
1− 〈θ+|θ−〉2
2
, (17)
QE =
1− sin 2θ
2
=
1−
√
1− 〈θ+|θ−〉2
2
. (18)
The IDP scheme is obtained for φ = 0 and γ = θ. In this case, we have Q? = cos 2θ = 〈θ+|θ−〉, QS = 1 − Q?
and QE = 0. If we restrict a consideration to the error-free sifted bits, then the quantity Q? gives a fraction of
inconclusive outcomes in Eve’s results. Conclusive eavesdropping was originally considered by Brandt [43]. Thus,
POVM measurements of the form (14) can be used for generalized discrimination interpolating between the Helstrom
and IDP schemes.
III. INFORMATION-THEORETIC FUNCTIONS OF THE RE´NYI TYPE
In this section, we recall some information-theoretic notions based on the Re´nyi entropies. Quantum key distribution
allows Alice and Bob to obtain two identical copies of a random and secret sequence of bits. Intruding into a
communication channel, Eve tries to recognize the secret sequence. During the process, each of the three parties will
obtain some string of bits. The three strings are typically treated as binary random variables [13]. To measure a
dependence between two random variables, one utilizes the concept of mutual information.
Let discrete variable X take values on some finite set, and let
{
p(x)
}
be the corresponding probability distribution.
The Shannon entropy of X is defined as [46]
H(X) := −
∑
x
p(x) log p(x) . (19)
The range of summation is usually clear from the context. The logarithm in (19) is taken to the base 2. If Y is another
random variable, then the joint entropy H(X,Y ) is defined by substituting joint probabilities p(x, y) into (19).
The concept of mutual information is connected with conditional entropies. The conditional form is commonly used
in information theory [46] as well as in applied disciplines. The standard conditional entropy is defined by
H(X |Y ) :=
∑
y
p(y)H(X |y) = −
∑
x
∑
y
p(x, y) log p(x|y) . (20)
Together with Bayes’ rule p(x|y) = p(x, y)/p(y), we used the particular function
H(X |y) = −
∑
x
p(x|y) log p(x|y) . (21)
It follows from concavity that H(X |Y, Z) ≤ H(X |Y ). In other words, conditioning on more can only reduce the
conditional entropy. The quantity (20) leads to one of widely used information distances [47]. The chain rule is very
important [46]
H(X,Y ) = H(X |Y ) +H(Y ) = H(Y |X) +H(X) . (22)
5The expression H(X |Y ) = H(X,Y )−H(Y ) reflects remaining lack of knowledge about X at the given Y .
The mutual information aims to measure how much information X and Y have in common [46], namely
I(X,Y ) := H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y ) . (23)
The quantity (23) is clearly symmetric in entries. It follows from the chain rule that
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) . (24)
So, the mutual information shows a reduction in the uncertainty of one random variable due to knowledge of others
[46]. In the context of quantum cryptography, the notion (23) was first applied in [13]. Known extensions of the above
concepts to entropic functions of the Re´nyi type lose some of the standard information-theoretic properties. For a
general discussion of distinguishability measures in quantum information science, see [48, 49] and references therein.
Entropic functions in application to quantum theory are reviewed in [50].
Overall, the standard information functions can be treated in operational terms. Moreover, the same formal
expressions lead to regular information functions of density matrices. It is important since the case of classical-
quantum-quantum-correlations underlies an analysis of secret-key distillation [51]. In particular, one uses (24) to
characterize the amount of information accessible when a sender encodes symbols via quantum states. The accessible
information is bounded from above due to the Holevo theorem (see, e.g., subsection 12.1.1 of [5]). In the context
of quantum cryptography, the Holevo quantity plays an important role in the Devetak–Winter formula [51]. The
so-called Devetak–Winter rate shows the asymptotic performance of a protocol with one-way classical communication
under collective attacks [4]. At the same time, the use of the mutual information (24) per se allows one to examine
security against collective attacks [31]. The optimal collective attack in the “device-independent” security scenario
was built in [52]. When Eve utilizes individual attacks, the security bound for one-way postprocessing can be given
according to Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [14]. It is sufficient for our aims to restrict a consideration to individual attacks. In
more detail, different types of attacks and related security characteristics are reviewed in section III of [4].
Re´nyi entropies form an important family of one-parametric extensions of the Shannon entropy (19). For 0 < α 6= 1,
the Re´nyi α-entropy is defined as [53]
Rα(X) :=
1
1− α log
(∑
x
p(x)α
)
. (25)
It does not increase with growth of α [53]. If p(x) = 1/N for all x, then the entropy (25) reaches its maximal value
equal to logN . In the limit α → 1, the right-hand side of (25) reduces to (19). The joint α-entropy Rα(X,Y ) is
defined according to (25) by substituting the joint probabilities. Special choices of the order α are widely used in the
literature. In the limit α→∞, we obtain the min-entropy
R∞(X) = − log
(
max p(x)
)
. (26)
The case α = 2 gives the so-called collision entropy, viz.
R2(X) = − log
(∑
x
p(x)2
)
. (27)
For α ∈ [0; 1], the Re´nyi entropy is concave independently of the effective dimensionality [54]. Convexity properties
of Rα(X) with orders α > 1 actually depend on dimensionality of probabilistic vectors [50, 55]. In particular, the
binary Re´nyi entropy is concave for α ∈ [0; 2] [55].
To quantify mutual information via functions of the Re´nyi type, the corresponding conditional entropies should be
used. There is no generally accepted definition of conditional Re´nyi’s entropy [16]. This variety reflect the fact that
generalized entropic functions lack some of important properties of regular ones. There are several ways to treat the
standard information functions in operational terms. It is hardly able to keep all of them, when generalized functions
are dealt with. First, we recall the quantity [56, 57]
R(1)α (X |Y ) :=
∑
y
p(y)Rα(X |y) , (28)
where
Rα(X |y) := 1
1− α log
(∑
x
p(x|y)α
)
. (29)
Despite of certain similarity between (20) and (28), the treatment ofR
(1)
α (X |Y ) as conditional entropy is not completely
legitimate. Basic properties of (28) are considered in [56, 57]. More special properties of the above conditional entropy
6with some applications were addressed in [58, 59]. The entropy (28) has been used in formulating the uncertainty
principle in successive measurements [60, 61]. This scenario is very close to that is dealt with in quantum key
distribution with eavesdropping.
It turned out that the conditional entropy (28) does not share the chain rule. Instead of (28), other definitions of
conditional Re´nyi’s entropy were proposed [16]. The authors of [62] proposed the conditional entropy written as
R(2)α (X |Y ) := Rα(X,Y )−Rα(Y ) . (30)
Here, the chain rule is posed by definition. However, the right-hand side of (30) cannot be re-expressed similarly to
(28). The authors of [17] reconsidered the notion of conditional Re´nyi’s entropy including five known suggestions and
also Arimoto’s version. The first and second of them are, respectively, defined as (28) and (30). The forth definition
from the list of [17] is of interest due to its fine properties. For 0 < α 6= 1, it is expressed as
R(4)α (X |Y ) :=
1
1− α log
(∑
y
p(y)
∑
x
p(x|y)α
)
. (31)
The third and fifth definitions from the list of [17] are inconsistent with the standard conditional entropy (20). Further,
we do not consider these definitions. It seems that Arimoto’s conditional Re´nyi entropy has found less attention than
it deserves [17]. One of its promising properties is the direct link to the corresponding quantum conditional entropy.
The latter notion naturally follows from the so-called “sandwiched” α-divergence of the Re´nyi type. Such quantum
divergences were proposed and motivated in [63, 64]. On the other hand, Arimoto’s conditional Re´nyi entropy has
more complicated functional form than the entropies (28), (30) and (31).
The conditional entropy (28) leads to the mutual information quantifier that has found use in studying individual
attacks on quantum cryptographic systems [15, 21–23, 43]. It is often treated without a complete theoretical back-
ground. The standard mutual information has some useful representations, each of which may give us an inspiration
to define an α-mutual information measure. In principle, the literature offers several approaches to accomplish such
generalization [65]. An unsophisticated approach to fit the concept of α-information merely takes the source from
(24). By an analogy with the formula (24), we can define the α-mutual information
I(1)α (X,Y ) := Rα(X)−R(1)α (X |Y ) . (32)
It is often interpreted as the Re´nyi α-measure of mutual information. With the choice α = 2, this quantity has
been adopted as a measure of probe performance in individual attacks on quantum cryptographic schemes [15, 21–
23, 43]. Thus, the quantity (32) has found use in applied disciplines, despite of incomplete status from the theoretical
viewpoint. When α 6= 1, the quantity (32) differs from (24) in some important respects. First, the function (32) is
not generally symmetric in its entries. Second, the parameter α runs a continuum of values, whence we should make
a proper choice of its value. Advantages of the approach with generalized entropic functions include a possibility to
vary the used parameter [57]. On the other hand, the conditional α-entropy (28) does not share the chain rule. So,
the right-hand side of (32) is something similar to (24) but is not similar to (23). One fails with interpreting (32) as a
reduction in the uncertainty of one random variable due to knowledge of others. For completeness of the presentation,
we will also consider the quantities
I(2)α (X,Y ) := Rα(X)−R(2)α (X |Y ) = Rα(X) +Rα(Y )−Rα(X,Y ) , (33)
I(4)α (X,Y ) := Rα(X)−R(4)α (X |Y ) . (34)
Here, we actually rewrite the right-hand side of (24) with the corresponding Re´nyi entropies. The quantity (33) is
obviously symmetric in entries. In both the cases, the limit α→ 1 leads to the standard mutual information (24).
Thus, information functions of the Re´nyi type are obtained in several ways. This non-uniqueness is revealed in
many questions including characteristics of quantum coherence [66, 67]. One must be very careful in interpretation
of (32)–(34), especially if only one value α 6= 1 is involved. In the following, we will use the term “α-measures of
mutual information”. However, these quantities are not fully legitimate measures of mutual information. This fact
was shown from the viewpoint of analyzing a performance of probes in individual attacks on the BB84 protocol [18].
It was assumed in [18] that Eve can utilize only the two schemes of state discrimination. The first of them is due to
Helstrom [32, 33], and the second one is commonly referred to as unambiguous discrimination independently developed
by in [34–36]. Focusing on the conclusive eavesdropping allows us to reveal a noticeable inadequacy of (32) served
as the measure of mutual information. This conclusion remains valid with more general scenarios of quantum state
discrimination on Eve’s side.
7IV. ENTROPIC UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS FOR GENERALIZED DISCRIMINATION
We will also use some entropic uncertainty bounds for measurements of the form (14). In the case of finite-
dimensional systems, entropic uncertainty relations were developed due to Deutsch [68] and Maassen and Uffink [42].
Many important results obtained in this way are reviewed in [69, 70]. Let us consider orthonormal bases G = {|gi〉}
and G′ = {|g′j〉} in d dimensions. If the pre-measurement state is described by d × d matrix ρ, then the generated
probabilities are equal to 〈gi|ρ|gi〉 and 〈g′j |ρ|g′j〉, respectively. Substituting these probabilities into (25), we have the
corresponding entropies Rα(G;ρ) and Rα(G′;ρ). The Maassen–Uffink uncertainty relation is posed as follows. One
should take the unitary matrix W with entries wij = 〈gi|g′j〉. For 1/α+ 1/β = 2, we have
Rα(G;ρ) +Rβ(G′;ρ) ≥ −2 log smax , (35)
where
smax := max
ij
|wij | . (36)
Maassen and Uffink presented the relation with Shannon entropies, viz. [42]
H(G;ρ) +H(G′;ρ) ≥ −2 log smax , (37)
but their method is actually sufficient for (35). It must be stressed that the result (37) was initially conjectured
by Kraus [71]. The author of [72] mentioned how the above relations can be applied to a single POVM. In effect,
the given POVM measurement can be realized as a projective one with different Naimark extensions. Adding third
component to kets of the set
{|γ±〉, |γ?〉}, we can build an orthonormal basis with the unitary Gramian matrix of size
3. The resulting vectors are written as
|γ˜±(ϕ)〉 = 1√
1 + η
 sin γ± cos γ√
η eiϕ
 , |γ˜?(ϕ)〉 = 1√
1 + η
 √2η0
−√1− η eiϕ
 , (38)
where η = cos 2γ. The phase factor eiϕ shows a unitary freedom in the ancillary one-dimensional space. Varying
ϕ, we obtain different extensions of the original POVM. We now apply (35) and (37) to the considered POVM by
inspecting matrix elements of the form 〈γ˜i(ϕ)|γ˜j(ϕ′)〉, so that
smax(ϕ, ϕ
′) := max
ij
∣∣〈γ˜i(ϕ)|γ˜j(ϕ′)〉∣∣ . (39)
As is noted in [72], we can further optimize the lower bound −2 log smax(ϕ, ϕ′) with respect to freely variable param-
eters. Calculations are somewhat long, though simple in matter. We refrain from presenting the details here. The
uncertainty relation for the POVM M = {M+,M−,M?} reads as
Rα(M;ρ) +Rβ(M;ρ) ≥ 2 log f(η) , (40)
where we put the function
f(η) :=

1+η
1−η , if η ∈ [0; 0.2] ,√
2−η
1−η , if η ∈ [0.2; 0.5] ,√
2−η
η
, if η ∈ [0.5; 1] .
(41)
The authors of [73] proposed an improvement of (37). In our notation, their result is expressed as
H(G;ρ) +H(G′;ρ) ≥ −2 log smax + (1− smax) log
(
smax
s2
)
, (42)
where s2 is the second largest value among moduli |wij | of entries wij = 〈gi|g′j〉. Applying (42) to the considered
POVM, we have
H(M;ρ) ≥ log f(η) + η U(0.2− η)
2(1 + η)
log
(
1− η
4η
)
. (43)
8By U(x), we denote here the unit step function, which is 0 for x < 0 and 1 for x > 0. In the right-hand side of (43),
the correction term is nonzero only for η < 0.2. It turns out that, for η > 0.2, optimizing the term −2 log smax(ϕ, ϕ′)
results in smax = s2.
Although the Maassen–Uffink uncertainty relation usually provides a very good estimation, majorization uncertainty
relations are sometimes stronger [74–76]. Here, some facts of matrix analysis should be recalled. For two integers
m,n ≥ 1, the symbol Mm×n(C) denotes the space of all m× n complex matrices. For any A ∈ Mm×n(C), the square
matrices A†A and AA† have the same nonzero eigenvalues. Taking the square root of these eigenvalues, one gets
nonzero singular values σj(A). The largest of singular values gives the spectral norm ‖A‖∞ of A. To the given unitary
matrix W, we assign the set of all its submatrices of class k defined by
SUB(W, k) := {A ∈Mr×r′(C) : r + r′ = k + 1, A is a submatrix of W} . (44)
The majorization relations of [74, 76] are formulated in terms of positive quantities
ζk := max
{‖A‖∞ : A ∈ SUB(W, k)} . (45)
Majorization relations of the tensor-product type [74, 75] are written with a probability vector ω′ such that
p⊗ q ≺ ω′ , (46)
where pi = 〈gi|ρ|gi〉 and qj = 〈g′j |ρ|g′j〉. The authors of [74] showed that the relation (46) holds for
ω′ = (ξ1, ξ2 − ξ1, . . . , ξd − ξd−1) , ξk = (1 + ζk)
2
4
. (47)
It follows from (47) that, for all α > 0, the sum of two α-entropies obeys
Rα(p) +Rα(q) ≥ Rα(ω′) . (48)
Majorization relations of the direct-sum type presented in [76] are based on the relation
p⊕ q ≺ {1} ⊕ ω . (49)
Generated probabilistic vectors obey (49) with ω = (ζ1, ζ2 − ζ1, . . . , ζd − ζd−1) [76]. The majorization relation (49)
further implies that
Rα(p) +Rα(q) ≥
{
Rα(ω) , for 0 < α ≤ 1 ,
2
1−α log
(
1
2 +
1
2
∑
i ω
α
i
)
, for 1 < α <∞ . (50)
Overall, the elements ζk are expressed due to (44) and (45) with the unitary matrix W =
[[〈gi|g′j〉]]. Although the
subscript k in (45) runs from 1 up to d2− 1, the condition of unitarity leads to ζd = 1 and, herewith, ζk = 1 for k ≥ d.
For 0 < α ≤ 1, one certainly has Rα(ω) ≥ Rα(ω′) [76]. For α > 1, we should keep in mind both the formulas (48)
and (50). We apply these relations to the POVM M = {M+,M−,M?} with different Naimark extensions. By doing
some calculations, one finally gets
Rα(M;ρ) ≥ 1
2
Rα(ω) (0 < α ≤ 1) , (51)
Rα(M;ρ) ≥ 1
2
Rα(ω
′) (1 < α <∞) , (52)
Rα(M;ρ) ≥ 1
1− α log
(
1
2
+
1
2
∑
i
ωαi
)
(1 < α <∞) , (53)
The vectors ω and ω′ are calculated due to the described scheme with c1 = f(η)−1,
c2 =

√
1+2η−3η2
1+η , if η ∈ [0; 0.2] ,√
2−2η
2−η , if η ∈ [0.2; 0.5] ,
1√
2−η , if η ∈ [0.5; 1] ,
(54)
and c3 = 1. Of course, for the Shannon entropy we have H(M;ρ) ≥ 0.5H(ω). For α > 1, the relations (52) and
(53) should be compared. The majorization uncertainty relations are sometimes stronger than the Maassen–Uffink
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FIG. 1: Comparison of the bounds from entropic uncertainty relations with the corresponding entropies of the completely
mixed state ρ
∗
of a qubit.
bound. To illustrate the lower bounds considered, their dependence on η is shown in Fig. 1. To estimate the range of
possible entropic variations, we also draw the corresponding entropies of the completely mixed state ρ∗ = 1 /2. It is
seen on the left plot of Fig. 1 that the relation (43) gives better estimation in a certain range of η. This fact coincides
with some observations reported in [76]. When η exceeds 0.6, the lower bound 0.5H(ω) from the direct-sum relation
is clearly stronger. When α 6= 1, we cannot use (40) to estimate from below Rα(M;ρ) solely. The right-hand sides
of (52) and (53) both give a desired estimation. For α = 2, the right-hand side of (52) is slightly better as we see on
the right plot of Fig. 1. In general, the curves based on entropic uncertainty relations are not smooth. Apparently,
more precise estimation could improve such curves including their asperities. But this will inevitably be related to
a kind of direct optimization. The presented lower bounds will further be used for estimating the standard mutual
information of Eve from above. It can be expected that the corresponding upper bounds are not smooth in certain
points.
V. MEASURES OF MUTUAL INFORMATION IN THE SCENARIO WITH GENERALIZED
DISCRIMINATION
In this section, we will study the α-measures (32)–(34) as quantifiers of a performance of the FPB quantum
cryptographic probe. The first-type information measure of order α = 2 was widely used for studying individual
attacks [15, 21–23, 43]. For this reason, we begin just with this measure and, throughout, other α-measures of the
same order α = 2. By the prime sign, we mean events related to the error-free sifted bits shared by Alice and Bob.
In the case under study, one has I(A′, B′) = 1 − h(PE), where h(PE) is the binary Shannon entropy. Despite of the
fact that 1 − h(PE) = 0 for PE = 0.5, we will further use the range PE ∈ [0; 1/3]. These points concern only our
particular scenario. Say, security of the BB84 scheme against basis-independent attacks is posed as follows (see, e.g.,
Theorem 1 of [27]). Secure final key can be extracted from sifted key at the asymptotic rate max{1− 2h(δ), 0}, where
δ is the error rate found in the verification test. The quantity 1 − 2h(δ) vanishes, when δ is about 11.0% [25]. The
latter gives the critical value of the quantum bit error rate for one-way postprocessing without preprocessing [4]. It
is sometimes referred to as the Shor–Preskill key rate. If one can use preprocessing or two-way postprocessing, then
the corresponding critical values can be increased [4]. However, these values are noticeably less than 1/3. Scenarios
with preprocessing or two-way postprocessing are beyond the scope of this work.
Since 〈t+|t+〉 = 〈t−|t−〉 = 1− PE , the angle θ ∈ [0;π/4] stood in (15) reads as
cos 2θ =
1− 3PE
1− PE , sin 2θ =
√
4PE(1 − 2PE)
1− PE , (55)
The following fact should be emphasized. We will focus on the case, when the legitimate users set the values 0 and 1 to
be equally likely. Hence, the binary variable B′ has the uniform distribution, so that Rα(B′) = log 2 = 1 irrespectively
to α. For α > β, we then obtain
I(1)α (B
′, E′) ≥ I(1)β (B′, E′) . (56)
It follows from the fact that R
(1)
α (B′|E′) ≤ R(1)β (B′|E′) for α > β.
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In the scenario with generalized scheme to distinguish |t+〉 and |t−〉, Eve’s activity is described by the two parameters
PE and φ. For the given PE ∈ [0; 1/3], the angle φ ranges between 0 and π/4− θ. For j = 0, 1, we now write
p(e′ = j|b′ = j) = QS , (57)
p(e′ = 0|b′ = 1) = p(e′ = 1|b′ = 0) = QE , (58)
p(e′ =?|b′ = j) = Q? , (59)
where the values of QS , QE , and Q? are given by (15). Multiplying the above expressions by 1/2, we obtain the
corresponding joint probabilities. Hence, we also have
p(e′ = j) =
1−Q?
2
, p(e′ =?) = Q? . (60)
Hence, we obtain H(E′) = 1−Q? + h(Q?). The final expressions for the conditional probabilities p(b′|e′) appear as
p(b′ = j|e′ = j) = QS
1−Q? , (61)
p(b′ = 0|e′ = 1) = p(b′ = 1|e′ = 0) = QE
1−Q? , (62)
p(b′ = j|e′ =?) = 1
2
. (63)
Due to (63), one gets R
(1)
α (B′|e′ =?) = log 2 = 1. For R(1)α (B′|e′ = j) with j = 0, 1, we obtain more complicated
formula. The resulting expression for the first-type α-measure of information reads as
I(1)α (B
′, E′) = (1−Q?)
[
1− log
(
QαS +Q
α
E
)
1− α +
α log(1−Q?)
1− α
]
. (64)
In particular, for α =∞ we have
I(1)∞ (B
′, E′) = 1−Q? − (1−Q?) log(1−Q?) + (1−Q?) logQS . (65)
Further, the standard mutual information is written as
I(B′, E′) = 1−Q? − (1−Q?) log(1−Q?) +QS logQS +QE logQE . (66)
We prefer to write the above expressions explicitly, since the quantity (64) has widely been used in considering
individual attacks.
Using the measures I
(1)
α (B′, E′), I
(2)
α (B′, E′), I
(4)
α (B′, E′) to estimate a performance of the FBP probe, we will
compare them with the standard mutual information. Due to [15], the quantity I
(1)
2 (B
′, E′) was often used for the
considered purposes. Since I
(1)
∞ (B′, E′) gives the upper bound due to (56), it will also be shown. With the two schemes
of state discrimination, this approach was discussed in [18]. It is useful to compare different information measures in
the context of generalized scenarios of discrimination on Eve’s side. We will reveal more brightly an inadequacy of
α-measures of mutual information in the considered context. To do so, we choose several intermediate values of φ
that discretize the allowed interval 0 ≤ φ ≤ π/4− θ. For definiteness, we will use the characteristic ratio
ξφ :=
φ
π/4− θ . (67)
Its least values 0 and 1 respectively correspond to the unambiguous discrimination and the Helstrom scheme. The
parameter (67) characterizes the amount of erroneous outcomes in Eve’s results. Further, measures of mutual infor-
mation will be visualized for ξφ = 0.00, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.00.
Let us begin with the standard mutual information for giving a certain benchmark. In the right plot of Fig. 2, we
show I(B′, E′) as a function of PE for several values of ξφ. The value of mutual information is maximal for ξφ = 1,
when Eve uses the Helstrom scheme. Eve’s mutual information is slightly reduced with decreasing of ξφ. We see
in Fig. 2 that for relatively small values of PE corresponding curves come very close to the curve ξφ = 1. Even in
the case of conclusive eavesdropping, Eve’s mutual information is quite comparable with this top curve. The latter
conclusion was already emphasized in [18]. The maximal difference between the two curves for ξφ = 1 and ξφ = 0
takes place for PE ≈ 0.227. Noticeable values of the relative difference between curves are observed for negligible
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values of PE . Further, we will refer to the considered picture in testing (32)–(34) as characteristics of Eve’s mutual
information.
Using the uncertainty relation of the previous section, we can estimate from above the standard mutual information
I(B′, E′). Although this estimate is not not very tight, it will describe a range of possible variations of information
measures. Combining (43) with (51) and applying the result to H(E′|b′) for every b′, we obtain
I(B′, E′) ≤ H(E′)−max
{
log f(η) +
η U(0.2− η)
2(1 + η)
log
(
1− η
4η
)
,
H(ω)
2
}
. (68)
Here, the parameter η characterizes Eve’s discrimination scheme. In Fig. 3, we present the mutual information
I(B′, E′) and the right-hand side of (68) for the two discrimination schemes on Eve’s side. The curves are not
smooth in certain points. This is originated in non-tightness of the uncertainty relations (43) and (51). Albeit they
were optimized with respect to possible Naimark extensions, the tight estimation is still not reached. Probably, an
improvement could estimate I(B′, E′) more smoothly. Nevertheless, the curves of Fig. 3 demonstrate that a range
of possible variations of the mutual information is narrow enough in the studied scenario. It will be instructive to
compare Fig. 3 with curves presented in the subsequent figures. At this point, we can recall the Shor–Preskill key
rate. Since the term 1 − 2h(PE) vanishes for PE ≈ 0.11, the corresponding estimation from above is not shown as
related to other scenarios.
Let us begin with information measures of the form I
(1)
α (B′, E′). As was already mentioned, the measure of
information of order α = 2 has found use in studying a performance of Eve’s entangling probes. In the left plot of
Fig. 4, we picture I
(1)
2 (B
′, E′) as a function of PE for the fifth values of ξφ. First of all, the curve for ξφ = 0 goes
just along its track in Fig. 2. Indeed, for conclusive eavesdropping we have I
(1)
2 (B
′, E′) = I(B′, E′). This principal
observation made in [18] has lead to the conclusion that the so-called Re´nyi mutual information is not a completely
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FIG. 4: The first-type measures I
(1)
2 (B
′, E′) and I
(1)
∞ (B
′, E′) versus PE for the five discrimination schemes on Eve’s side.
legitimate measure. Using the curves drawn in Fig. 4, we further support the mentioned conclusion. We see in Fig.
2 that the lines of I(B′, E′) for intermediate values of ξφ are very close to each other. At the same time, the lines of
I
(1)
2 (B
′, E′) diverge more notably. Distinctions between two adjacent curves in the left plot of Fig. 4 become larger in
comparison with Fig. 2. The less a fraction of inconclusive answers is, the more I
(1)
2 (B
′, E′) deviates from I(B′, E′).
In effect, the mentioned feature concerns even small values of PE .
It is instructive to inspect the situation for other values of α. In the right plot of Fig. 4, we picture I
(1)
∞ (B′, E′)
as a function of PE for the fifth values of ξφ. Curves for α = ∞ are demonstrative due to the property (56). We
observe very essential buckling of the curves with a little fraction of inconclusive answers. If our approach is based
on the measure (65), then we should accept an essential weakness of scenarios with a large fraction of inconclusive
answers. So, we could underestimate the degree of vulnerability with respect to conclusive eavesdropping and close
scenarios. As is seen in the plots of Fig. 4, wrong pictures are especially noticeable for relatively small values of
PE . Dealing with communication security, we cannot be guided by false proposals. At least in the case of individual
attacks, α-measures of mutual information of the Re´nyi type are not completely adequate quantifiers. Thus, we
have additionally confirmed the fact that the standard mutual information is the only reliable base for estimating
quantum-cryptographic probes.
The mentioned distinction is most essential for “weak” eavesdropping, when Eve attempts to get a small amount
of information while causing only a slight disturbance. It is sufficiently typical that an opposite party tries to cloak
its activity against legitimate users. If we abandon the standard measure, then a quality of the usual FPB probe
in comparison with conclusive ones may be illusory up to several times. This example illustrates a conclusion that
security restrictions could be overstated spuriously on the base of inadequate measures. Such wrong conclusions about
too strong probe performance may lead to rejecting some feasible realizations. They might falsely be evaluated as
very vulnerable, even though they are suitable in other respects. As is emphasized in section VI.L of [2], the infinite
security will demand the infinite cost. In practice, characteristics of a quantum-cryptographic system are actually
determined by some compromise between several conflicting requirements. Hence, we wish to avoid wrong conclusions
of any kind.
Let us consider briefly the quantities (33) and (34). They can be treated as candidates to quantify Eve’s mutual
information about the error-free sifted bits. The case α = 2 was first be taken concerning an inadequacy of the
considered measures to characterize a performance of the FPB probe. With growth of order α, similarly inconsistent
pictures turned out to be placed. Doubts revealed for α = 2 will become even more visible. To demonstrate the
fact, we shall draw the corresponding curves for α = 10. This choice is neither better nor worse than others. Rather,
it allows us to review a general picture for relatively large values of α. In contrast with (32), the quantity (33) is
symmetric. If α is very close to 1, then a picture almost reproduces that is shown in the right plot of Fig. 2. It is
not amazing since the right-hand side of (33) aims to simulate the right-hand side of (23). When α deviates from 1,
the corresponding curves are changed essentially. To illustrate this fact, we present the cases α = 2 and α = 10 in
Fig. 5. The resulting curves reveal a behavior quite different from the curves shown in Figs. 2 and 4. For relatively
small values of ξφ = 1, we see an s-like shape. That is, for schemes with sufficient number of inconclusive answers
the measure (33) is even less suitable than (32). In the left plot of Fig. 5, the lines for ξφ = 1 and ξφ = 0.75 are
clearly intersected with an intermediate value PE ≈ 0.108. No such intersection takes place in Figs. 2 and 4. More
intersections are observed in the right plot of Fig. 5. We finish with the quantity (34) related to more sophisticated
version (31) of conditional Re´nyi’s entropy. The cases α = 2 and α = 10 are shown in Fig. 6. Although the left plot
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10 (B
′, E′) versus PE for the five discrimination schemes on Eve’s side.
of Fig. 6 is similar to the left plot of Fig. 4, the right one is very different. For α = 10, the lines for various values of
ξφ intersect many times. These observations witness that the α-measures of information are adequate only when α is
very close to 1. However, the latter inevitably implies the use of the standard measure I(B′, E′).
Several final remarks concern a possible usage of generalized information functions. The above discussion does not
aim to criticize extended information-theoretic functions in general. In effect, generalized entropies were fruitfully
used in many important questions. In future, such functions may found novel interesting applications. We only wish
to emphasize the necessity of a certain circumspection with their handling in new areas. It is known that generalized
entropic functions do not succeed all the properties of the standard functions. For instance, the definition (32) is
based on the conditional entropic form, which does not share the chain rule. The authors of [62] have treated the
chain rule just as the definition of conditional Re´nyi’s entropy. However, we have above seen an inadequacy of several
α-measures of mutual information. Other forms of conditional Re´nyi’s entropy, even more sophisticated, will hardly
able to improve such things. A certain caution is necessary for dealing with conclusions obtained on the base of
generalized information functions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have examined scenarios with generalized state discrimination after the action of the FPB probe. From this
viewpoint, we further studied different quantifiers of an amount of Eve’s mutual information about the error-free
sifted bits. The so-called Re´nyi information of order α = 2 was widely adopted for estimation of a performance of
quantum cryptographic probes. It seems that this quantity is not a completely appropriate measure. In the context
of individual attacks on the BB84 scheme, wrong conclusions are inspired by means of the first-type 2-measure and
related ones. We have also examined another families of information measures inspired by conditional Re´nyi entropies.
It turned out that such measures are even more inadequate from the viewpoint of considered questions. Rather, a
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performance of quantum cryptographic entangling probes is to be evaluated on the base of standard information
functions. Using generalized entropies in studies of security of quantum cryptography, we should at least compare
various choices of the entropic parameter.
On the other hand, the standard information functions may also be less suitable in some circumstances. In quantum
information theory, we have come across numerous questions of different kind. The authors of the papers [77, 78]
addressed the problem of properly quantifying informational content of an unknown quantum state. It is natural to
adopt mutually unbiased measurements for such purposes. As is shown in [77, 78], the sum of corresponding Shannon
entropies has several counter-intuitive properties. More appropriate measure has been proposed and motivated therein.
This approach is immediately connected with generalized entropies of order 2 [79]. So, we see that the standard
information functions should sometimes be replaced with other functions. A priori, no quantifier can be recognized
as the only justified one. Rather, we shall apply several approaches and compare the conclusions obtained. Among
existing questions, using the so-called fake states to detect an opposite activity has received less attention than it
deserves. In any case, a validity of information measures in application to quantum cryptography should be further
studied.
To realize information processing with quantum carriers, real-life systems often deal with imperfect devices. Hence,
various security loopholes inevitably occur. The problem of detection-side attacks can be removed by the concept
of measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography [80]. Although such attacks are treated as most critical,
source-side loopholes should also be removed in practice. For instance, many systems implementing the BB84 protocol
realize the source through a weak coherent state with using the decoy-state technique. The authors of [44] described a
powerful attack on such systems. It combines the measurement for unambiguous state discrimination with a photon-
number-splitting attack. Here, quantum key distribution without phase randomization can be compromised [44].
Generalized discrimination schemes in source-side attacks on decoy-state quantum cryptography could be the subject
of separate investigation.
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